We consider a resource management problem in a multi-cell downlink OFDMA network whereby the goal is to find the optimal combination of (i) assignment of users to base stations and (ii) resource allocation strategies at each base station. Efficient resource management protocols must rely on users truthfully reporting privately held information such as downlink channel states. However, individual users can manipulate the resulting resource allocation (by misreporting their private information) if by doing so they can improve their payoff. Therefore, it is of interest to design efficient resource management protocols that are strategy-proof, i.e. it is in the users' best interests to truthfully report their private information. Unfortunately, we show that the implementation of any protocol that is efficient and strategyproof is NP-hard. Thus, we propose a computationally tractable strategy-proof mechanism that is approximately efficient, i.e. the solution obtained yields at least 1 2 of the optimal throughput. Simulations are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
assignment and the per-network resource allocation need to be performed jointly to achieve optimal network-wide resource allocation as well as load balancing across different networks.
There are three major challenges for optimal resource allocation in such networks.
1) When operating in FDD mode, the network requires the users to measure and report the downlink channel states for efficient resource allocation. An untruthful user may incorrectly report this information for its own benefit. The possibilities of various forms of untruthfulness in user behaviors in wireless networks have been recently noted (see e.g., [4] [5] [6] ). As suggested in [4] , in FDD cellular networks it is possible to manipulate the devices' channel feedback procedure, as the compliance testing is usually limited to a few standardized scenarios. The presence of the untruthful users can significantly reduce the overall system performance and limit network access to truthful users.
2) Even assuming the users truthfully report their channels, finding the global optimal resource allocation is still computationally intractable (which will be shown in Section II).
3) There is no central entity to compute and enforce a desired user-network assignment and network resource allocation [3] .
Consequently, a good resource allocation scheme must possess the following features: i) it should provide efficient utilization of the spectrum; ii) it must be strategy-proof, i.e., it is in the users' best interests to truthfully reveal their private information; iii) it is distributedly implementable, in the sense that both the BSs and the users can take part in the scheme with only local information and local computation.
The joint problem of BS assignment and resource allocation in OFDMA network has been analyzed under complete information and the ability to enforce decisions from a centralized standpoint, for example, [7] , [8] . However, in many practical networks there are no entities capable of performing the centralized decision making. Another strand of the literature deals precisely with this case by using non-cooperative game theory [9] [10] [11] [12] . Users selfishly compute their power control and cell site selection strategies to maximize their own utilities. With proper design of the utility functions, equilibrium solutions can be obtained in distributed fashion. However, complete information on the channel states and/or the utility functions is assumed. The overall efficiencies of the identified equilibrium solutions are not characterized.
There are several recent works that design mechanisms for resource allocation problems in networks with strategic users and/or incomplete information [4] , [13] . It is commonly assumed that there is a closed-form expression describing 0733-8716/12/$31.00 c 2012 IEEE the interdependency of users' decisions. In contrast, in our problem the interdependency in users' decisions is only implicitly characterized as the solution to the optimal resource management problem at each BS. As a result, the problem considered in this paper does not adequately fit into any of the frameworks considered in the above cited papers. We mention that the recent work [4] considered an incomplete information setting similar to ours, in which the FDD network lacks the true channel states due to the false report by the users. The objective though is to optimally schedule the users, which is different from the objective of the present paper.
Lower bounds of the efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium (NE), or the price of anarchy, have been analyzed for network resource allocation games. Reference [14] considered a routing game in which the inefficiency is due to the selfishness of the users. Reference [15] analyzed a network utility maximization problem in which the strategic behavior of the users leads to efficiency loss. For both of the above cases the optimal system level problems can be solved globally, whereas in our case the overall problem is already difficult to solve. In [16] , Vetta discussed the lower bounds of the NEs for a family of non-cooperative games assuming a special structure of the users' utility functions. Applications of this latter result in communication and sensor networks include [17] and [18] . However, these works use highly stylized utility functions so that the result in [16] can be directly used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the problem and provides its complexity status. Section III and IV describe the mechanism for the resource management problem as well as its distributed implementation. Section V gives some extensions of the algorithm. Section VI provides simulation results. Section VII concludes the paper.
Notations: We use bold faced characters to denote vectors. We use x[i] to denote the ith element of vector x. We use x −i to denote the vector [x [1] , · · · ,
We use [y, x −i ] to denote a vector x with its ith element replaced by y. We use ∨ to denote componentwise maximization:
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a service area with a set N {1, 2, · · · , N} of users served by a set W {1, 2, · · · , W } of BSs (or networks). Each BS w operates on the set of channels K w , with the bandwidth of each channel equally set to be Δf w . Let K ∪ w∈W K w denote the set of all channels. Suppose any two channels do not overlap, i.e., K w ∩K v = ∅, ∀ w = v. Such assumption is justified for example in the multi-technology HetNet or in the IEEE 802.22 cognitive radio Wireless Regional Area Network (WRAN) [2] . In the latter network, a particular geographical region may be served by multiple service providers (SPs), or by multiple Access Points (APs) installed by a single SP. When operating in the "normal mode", the APs/SPs that serve the same region indeed operate on non-overlapping portions of the available spectrum, by using proper spectrum etiquette protocols (see Section 6.22 in [2] ).
Let |h k i | 2 k∈Kw denote the channel gains of the channels from BS w to user i; Let n k i k∈K denote the set of measured noise powers at user i on different channels. Both the channel gains and the noise powers are considered as private information to the users, as in the FDD mode they are measured at the mobile devices and then fedback to the BSs. Define a length N vector a as the association profile in the network, with its ith element a[i] = w indicating that user i is associated to BS w. Define a −i [a [1] , · · · , a[i − 1], a[i + 1], · · · a[N ]] as an association profile in which user i drops out of the network. For each BS w, denote the set of associated users as N w (a) {i : a[i] = w}, which is a function of a.
In a downlink OFDMA network, a BS w ∈ W can transmit to a single user i ∈ N w (a) on a given channel k ∈ K w . Let β w {β k w } k∈Kw be a feasible channel assignment scheme for BS w, i.e., β k w = i ∈ N w (a) means channel k is assigned to user i. Let p w {p k w } k∈Kw be a feasible power allocation scheme for BS w:
Let us define r i (β, p, a) as the transmission rate that user i can obtain under the resource allocation scheme (β, p, a). With continuous rate adaptation, this rate can be expressed as:
where 1{·} is the indicator function; τ is the capacity gap which is determined by the target Bit Error Rate (BER) as: τ = − ln(5BER) 1.5 (see [19] ). The objective of the resource allocation is to find the tuple (β, p, a) that achieves efficient spectrum utilization within each BS/network while balancing the loads across different BSs/networks. Mathematically, we formulate the overall resource allocation problem as follows max a,β,p w∈W
The load balancing property of this formulation is manifested by: 1) introducing the association as a decision variable for the users; 2) including the weighting factors {α w ≥ 0} W w=1 in the objective. The first factor enables the users to effectively avoid congestion by switching to lightly loaded BSs in a timely fashion, while the second factor allows the network operator to further shift the traffic to the BSs with larger weights.
We first describe each BS's optimal resource management strategy. Let us assume that each BS w has perfect knowledge of the normalized channel states of its associated users h w h k i n k i i∈Nw (a),k∈Kw (this assumption will be relaxed later). First consider a simple case where an equal power allocation strategy is used, that is: p k w =p w |Kw| , ∀ k ∈ K w . Each BS w then optimizes its throughput by picking a suitable user to serve on each channel. Mathematically, it solves the following channel assignment (CA) problem
The optimal solution to this problem is to assign each channel to the best user [20] :
(
On the other hand, if the BSs can optimize both its channel assignment and power allocation, then a BS w solves the following channel assignment and power allocation (CAPA) problem:
The optimal solution to this problem can be written in closed form [21] :
where λ ≥ 0 is the dual variable associated with the power budget constraint. We note that the power constraint is binding at the optimal solution: k∈Kw (p k w ) * =p w . With some abuse of notations, we use r i (a) to denote the optimal rate for user i obtained by using either the CA or CAPA strategy (the actual strategy used will be indicated using a superscript CA or CAPA when necessary). When a is fixed, we denote the weighted optimal throughput of BS w by: R w (a) α w i∈Nw (a) r i (a).
We then investigate the complexity status of the throughput optimization problem (SYS). A tuple (β * , p * , a * ) is an optimal solution of the problem (SYS) only if each BS uses the CAPA strategy. Although finding the CAPA solution is easy when the user-BS association is fixed, the problem turns out to be intractable when the association becomes an optimization variable. Due to space limitation, we refer the readers to [22] for detailed proof of the following complexity result.
Theorem 1: Finding the optimal solution to the problem (SYS) is strongly NP-hard.
Note that this complexity result differs from most existing complexity results for resource management in wireless communications [23] , in which the hardness of the problem is mainly due to the possibility of strong interference among the users. In contrast, in our problem the hardness lies in its mixed (discrete and continuous) formulation.
III. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR JOINT BS ASSOCIATION
AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION The previous section analyzes the per-BS and the overall resource allocation problem assuming complete information at the network side. However, in an FDD network, there is an intrinsic asymmetry in the available information at the BSs and at the users, as the downlink channel and the noise powers are measured by the users. Strategic (selfish) users can exploit such asymmetry of information for their own benefit by tampering with the devices if necessary [4] . We now provide a simple illustration of the potential inefficiency caused by the manipulation of channel state information.
Example 1: Consider the network consisting of 1 BS and 2 users with 3 channels. Let the noise power n k i = 1 for all i, k, and let τ = 1. Assume that the BS has a total power of 3. The channel gains are given as follows:
When all the users report truthfully, and when the CA strategy is used, user 1 will be scheduled on channel 1 and 2, while user 2 will be scheduled on channel 3. A throughput of 3 log(1 + 2) ≈ 3.29 nats/s can be obtained. When user 1 remains truthful but user 2 becomes selfish, and it falsely reports its channels as (3, 3, 2) , the BS will assign all the channels to user 2. The actual rate that user 2 obtains still depends on its true channels 1 . Thus a throughput of 2 log(1 + 0.5) + log(1 + 2) ≈ 1.91 nats/s will be obtained, which is only about 58% of the optimal system throughput. In contrast, user 2's untruthful behavior leads to its own rate increase of over 70%, at the expense of starving user 1.
A. The VCG mechanism
The optimization of system performance when strategic users have private information can be formulated as a mechanism design problem. Assuming users have quasilinear utility, a system of incentives (interference taxes) may be put in place in order to align individual users' preferences with the goal of optimizing system performance. The goal therefore is to find the interference taxes that support the implementation of efficient resource allocation in dominant strategies, i.e. for each user, the truthful revelation of channel state information is optimal regardless of the information reported by all other users. The search for mechanisms is typically restricted to the class of direct mechanisms in which users report their private information to a third-party, which in turn allocates resources and implements a system of incentives via taxes.
The celebrated VCG mechanism achieves this goal by having users report their privately held information on channel states to a central controller (CU), who computes the globally optimal solution of (SYS) given the reported information. The CU then assigns the users to the BSs and a given rate according to the optimal solution of (SYS). Each user, when attempting to manipulate the allocation of resources by misreporting channel state information, is penalizes for the deterioration of system performance for all other users. This is the basis for the VCG mechanism being strategy-proof, i.e. for each individual user, truthful revelation of channel state information is optimal regardless of the information reported by all other users. It should be also emphasized here that any other direct and strategy-proof mechanism implementing the solution to (SYS) is an instance of the VCG mechanism with interference taxes modified by a constant (see [24, Corollary 5.1] ). Unfortunately, in the previous section we showed that finding the the global optimal solution of (SYS) is an NP-hard problem. Thus, a computationally tractable direct mechanism cannot be both strategy-proof and efficient.
Our strategy for designing a computationally tractable mechanism is to relax the requirement of optimality so that an approximately optimal solution of (SYS) can be implemented in dominant strategies. In the mechanism proposed below, tractability is achieved by: (i) decentralizing the resource allocation decisions to each BS and implementing the VCG mechanism in a per BS basis (section III-B below); (ii) allowing the users to dynamically adjust their choices of association (section III-C below).
B. Implementing VCG at each BS with Fixed Association
We formally describe the implementation of the VCG mechanism for given user-BS association profile a. Recall that optimal per-BS strategies were described in Section II.
Define the normalized channels as h i,w
Define user i's reported normalized channels as h i,w . Define h −i,w and h w similarly. When we take untruthfulness into consideration, a user i's rate depends on the following two terms: 1) the reported normalized channel, denoted as h w , by which the BS makes the resource allocation decision; 2) the actual normalized channel h i,w , by which user i experiences the actual rate. We signify such dependencies by using r i (a; h i,w , h w ) to denote user i's rate. If the information reported by the users is h w , a tax T i (a; h w ) will be levied upon user i, and its net utility is
The tax assessed on user i is computed based on the reported channels. It is given as the total rate improvement the set of remaining users N w (a) \ i can obtain if user i leaves BS w:
It is well known that the tax expressed in (5) ensures that each user has an incentives to act truthfully. More specifically, regardless of other users' reports h −i,w , user i can always achieve higher utility by acting truthfully:
We refer the readers to [24, Section 5.4] for detailed proof of this inequality in a more general context.
In the reminder of this paper, we will assume that the VCG mechanism is implemented at each BS. Thus, we will simply write r i (a) instead of r i (a; h i,w , h w ). The user i's tax term (5) and utility term (4) can be simplified as (assuming a[i] = w)
In summary, by using the VCG mechanism within each BS, all the users will act truthfully, which in turn allows the BSs to optimally implement their resource allocation strategies. It is important to note here, that even in the ideal scenario where all the users behave truthfully, the tax and utility function defined in (6) and (7) are still extremely useful. As will be seen in the subsequent sections, they lead to simple and efficient networkwide resource allocation.
C. The User-BS Association Game
Suppose users are allowed to autonomously select which BS to connect to. Assuming each BS implements a VCG mechanism, we are left with a user-BS association game. We will occasionally use the superscripts CA or CAPA to specify the strategies used by the BSs. Let us define a non-cooperative BS association game as:
is the utility of user i as defined in (7) .
Interestingly, unlike most conventional games, in game G, the interdependencies of the users' strategies are only implicitly given. For example, suppose a[i] = w, a[j] = q. In order to assess the impact of user i's change of association from BS w to BS q on user j's utility, BS q's resource allocation problem (either CA or CAPA) needs to be solved. There is no closed-form expression governing the users' interdependencies. This unique property of the game makes our subsequent analysis, particularly the efficiency of the NE of game G, very involved.
In the following result, we characterize the utility function U i (a) and the tax function T i (a). The proof of this result is quite straightforward, and we omit them due to space limits.
Proposition 1: When all the BSs use either the CA or the CAPA strategy, T i (a) ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N. Moreover, the users' utility functions are bounded:
We then present a series of results characterizing the pure NEs for game G.
For a fixed a, we define BR i (a) as the set of "better-reply" BSs for user i:
The pure strategy NE of the game G is a profile a * in which BR i (a * ) = ∅, ∀ i ∈ N . Equivalently, all users prefer to stay in their current BSs:
Let R(a) w∈W α w R w (a) denote the weighted system throughput for fixed association a. Our first result analyzes the existence of the pure NE of game G. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2: The game G must admit at least one pure NE. In particular, the association profile a ∈ arg max a R(a) must be a pure NE of this game.
The existence of pure NE for the game G could be attributed to the tax charged by the BSs. Without such tax, there could be no pure NE. To illustrate, define a new game in which users are not charged with taxation, and their utilities are just their rates:
We claim that if all the BSs use either CA or CAPA strategy, this game does not always admit a pure NE. We show this claim by giving two counterexamples. Table I 
For both examples, we show in Table II that in every possible association profile, there exists at least one user whose betterreply set is nonempty.
Example 2 illustrates that it is the interference tax imposed by the BSs that ensures the existence of the pure NE for game G. In fact, such tax also guarantees the efficiency of the outcome of the game. Theorem 2 asserts that the maximum weighted throughput achievable by all the NEs is the same as the optimal system weighted throughput. In the following, we further provide a lower bound for the efficiency of the NEs. Central to the derivation of such lower bound is certain submodular property of the per-BS throughput function R w (·). Note that R w (a) depends on the association profile a only through the set of associated users N w (a). We can then rewrite R w (a) as R w (N w (a)), which is expressed as a function of the set of associated users. Then we say that R w (·) is submodular if the following is true for all i ∈ N and M ⊆ G ⊆ N
The submodularity implies that there is a marginal decrease of throughput when the total number of associated users increases. In [25] , the authors shown that for a fixed power allocation without the total power constraint, the capacity of a fading multiple access channel is a submodular function. However, in our case showing the submodularity of the throughput R w (·) is much more involved, as our resource allocation is the solution to the underlying optimization problems, hence it is dynamic with respect to the set of associated users.
Once the submodularity property is shown, we can utilize a result from Vetta [16] to obtain the desired lower bound. In particular, reference [16] introduces the notion of valid-utility games, for which lower bounds for the efficiency of the NE is 1 2 . We will show that our BS selection game G belongs to the family of valid-utility games.
Theorem 3: The weighted system throughput achieved in any NE of the game G must be at least half of that achieved under the optimal user-BS assignment. Proof: It is easy to check that R w (·) has a monotonicity property:
We then claim that R w (·) satisfies (9). We only give proof for the (more difficult) CAPA case, the CA case is a straightforward extension. For simplicity of notations, we let BS w operate on all channels K, set n k j = 1 for all j, k, and let α w = 1. Fix two sets M, G with M ⊆ G, fix an arbitrary user i with arbitrary channel gains. Define three vectors g, m, h ∈ R K + , with their elements given as
Note g and m represent the best channel gain on each channel for the set of users G and M, respectively. From the fact that M ⊆ G, we have that m ≤ g. Note that the throughput obtained by BS w using the CAPA strategy is dependent on the set of associated users only through the best channel vector. As a result, we can also express R w (G) as R w (g), and R w (G∪ {i}) as R w (g ∨ h). In this notation, the submodular property (9) is equivalent to
In the same token, the monotonicity of R w (·) can be expressed as:
We then present a sufficient condition for (11) which is easier to verify. Let e k be a K × 1 unit vector with its k th element being 1. Write h = K k=1 e k h[k]. Then we have the two equations on the top of the following page. In order for (11) to be true, it is sufficient that for all k ∈ K, the following is true
Condition (12) (12) is true for all k ∈ Q and k ∈ Q. The proof for this result is given in the Appendix. To this point we have shown that R w (·) is submodular and monotone. From Proposition 1 we have that w i∈Nw (a) U i (a) ≤ w R w (a). Additionally, the definition of U i (·) ensures that it is equal to the difference of the system throughput with and without user i (cf. (7)). As a result, game G is a valid utility game, and we can use [16, Theorem 3] to show that any NE of the game achieves at least 1 2 of the optimal weighted throughput. This completes the proof.
We emphasize that all the results derived in Section III-C hold true regardless of the presence of the untruthful users,
TABLE III THE PROPOSED MECHANISM S1) Initialization: Let t=0, let the users choose their nearest BSs. S2) BS Optimization: Based on current a (t) , each BS implements a VCG mechanism. S3) User Optimization:
out from the end of the memory; S3-3) Determine the Next BS Association: Uniformly sample user i's memory; obtain a BS index as a (t+1) 
Otherwise, let t=t+1, go to S2).
as long as the BSs implement the taxation for each user as specified in (6) and (7) . This is because the association game G is built upon the assumption that the BSs use the VCG mechanism, and that the users are always truthful.
IV. A DYNAMIC MECHANISM
In this section we introduce a mechanism that allows the users and the BSs to jointly compute a NE of the game G, which is a high quality solution for the joint BS selection and resource allocation problem. All the results in this section are applicable to both games G CA and G CAPA . Suppose each user maintains a length M memory that operates in a first in first out fashion. Each user's memory is used to store its best associations in the last M iterations.
We first briefly describe the main steps of the proposed mechanism. It alternates between a BS optimization step and a user optimization step. When it is the BSs' turn to act, based on the current set of associated users, each of the BSs optimally allocates the resources in its own cell using the VCG mechanism. When it is the users' turn to act, each of them first computes its current best BS (in terms of achieved individual utility) according to the current association profile. It then pushes the best BS into its memory, and randomly samples one BS from its memory for actual association. The proposed mechanism is detailed in Table III , where the superscript (t) denotes the iteration number.
An important feature of the mechanism is that each of its steps can be implemented distributedly. The following two assumptions on the network are needed for such purpose: 1) Local channel information is known by each BS. That is, each BS w has the knowledge of |h k i | 2 k∈Kw,i∈N , but not the channels related to other BSs. 2) Each BS has a feedback channel to all the potential users.
Under the above assumptions, the mechanism can be implemented distributedly. In the BSs' optimization step, the BSs compute the taxes and perform their per-cell resource allocation (cf. Section II and III-B). They are not required to have the knowledge of the operational conditions or channel states related to other BSs. In the users' optimization step, to compute the set BR i (a (t) ), each user i needs to know −i ]). To obtain the second term in (8) , BS w solves its per-cell problem with and without user i (cf. (7)). In practice, the users may only switch to a new BS if it offers significantly higher utility, because each of such switch induces costs such as message passing. Let us use c i to denote such cost for user i. When switching costs are included into the decision process, in each iteration of the mechanism, w * ∈ BR i (a (t) ) implies U i ([w * , a (t) −i ]) > U i (a (t) ) + c i . This modification could reduce the number of iterations needed for convergence (the users are now less willing to switch), but could also reduce the system throughput achieved by the identified NE.
We remark that the proposed mechanism is similar in form to the JASPA algorithm studied in [10] . However, they are used in different network settings (uplink v.s. downlink, multiple access channel v.s. OFDMA). Moreover, in the current setting both the BSs and the users need to be involved in the optimization, while in [10] , only the mobile users participate in the optimization. Most importantly, the present algorithm achieves a constant fraction of the system throughput, while the JASPA algorithm in [10] does not possess such desirable property.
The convergence property of the proposed mechanism is provided in the following theorem, the proof of which is delegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 4: When choosing M ≥ N , the BS association mechanism produces a sequence a (t) ∞ t=1 that converges to a NE of game G with probability 1 (w.p.1).
V. DISCUSSIONS
To this point we have assumed that the BSs maximize the per-BS throughput. Such assumption allows the BSs to have closed-form solution to their optimization problems, and it leads to properties such as submodularity of the throughput Firstly, all the previous properties of the mechanism can be straightforwardly generalized to the case where each BS w aims to maximize a weighted throughput of the form i∈Nw γ i r i . The set of weights {γ i ≥ 0} N i=1 can be adjusted adaptively by the BSs over time to ensure fairness among the users' time-averaged transmission rates (see e.g., [26] ).
Consider an alternative case in which BS w is interested in finding the best channel assignment to achieve the proportional fairness (PF). The per-BS problem is then given by [27] max β w i∈Nw (a) α w log (r i (β, p, a) )
This problem generally does not admit a closed-form solution, and the BS needs to perform numerical search to obtain the optimal solutions (see [27] for a set of efficient search algorithms). Let us use r PF i (a) to denote the resulting transmission rate for user i. Following (7) , each user i in cell w has the following utility U PF i (a) α w log(r P F i (a)) − T P F i (a), where T PF i (a) α w j∈Nw (a−i) log(r PF j (a −i )) − α w j∈Nw (a)\i log(r PF j (a)). We can now construct a PF association game G PF with each user's utility function given as U PF i (·). Similarly as in Theorem 2, we can show that the optimal association profile a * = arg max a w α w i∈Nw (a) log(r PF i (a)) must be a NE of this game. Our proposed mechanism can be applied for finding the NE of this game.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm. Both indoor and outdoor network scenarios are considered.
A. An Indoor Network Scenario
We have the following settings for this part of the simulation. Let us denote a 50m × 50m indoor area as A; denote the 25m × 25m central area of A as C; define the border of A as B. Define the parameter 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 as the distribution factor of the users/BSs: 1) D × 100% of the users and BSs are randomly placed in A; 2) the rest of the users are randomly placed in C and the rest of the BSs are randomly placed on B. When D is small, the subset of BSs that are located at the center of the area become hotspots and are likely to be congested. Let d i,w denote the distance between user i and BS w. The channels between user i and BS w, {h k i } k∈Kw , are generated independently from the complex Gaussian distribution CN (0,
The random variable L i,w models the shadowing effect, i.e., 10 log 10(L i,w ) ∼ N(0, 64) is a real Gaussian random variable. The variable P L i,w is the pathloss between BS w and user i. To model the pathloss in the indoor scenario, the office environment model [28] is used. We set the length of the memory to 10 and the weights α w = 1 for all w. The other key simulation parameters are given in Table  IV .
The performance of the proposed algorithm will be compared with the algorithm that first assigns the users to their nearest BSs, and then optimally perform the per-BS resource allocation. Note that this algorithm separates the process of association and per-cell resource allocation, hence in most cases gives degraded system performance. Throughout this subsection, the CAPA strategy will be adopted for per-BS resource allocation.
The first set of experiments evaluate the convergence performance of the proposed mechanism. Fig. 1 plots 3 realizations of the evolution of system throughput. This figure demonstrates the ability of the algorithm to "track" the equilibrium solutions. The algorithm takes a few iterations to converge to new equilibria when the following events occur at iteration 100: 1) 10 (randomly placed) new/old users enter/leave the system; 2) all of the users' channel gains are re-generated (with the locations of the users and BSs unchanged).
In Fig. 2 , we evaluate the averaged convergence time for the algorithm. We highlight its "tracking" ability by adding a number of new users and by randomly re-generating all the users' channel gains after an equilibrium has been reached. The algorithm is able to track the equilibrium much faster than performing a complete restart.
The second set of experiments intend to evaluate the throughput performance of the proposed algorithm. We first investigate a small network with 10 users, 64 channels and 1 − 4 BSs, and compare the performance of the proposed algorithms to the global optimal solution of the problem (SYS) (obtained by an exhaustive search). The results are shown in Fig. 3 . We see that the proposed algorithm, abbreviated as Distributed BS Association (DBSA), achieves little throughput loss. In contrast, the nearest BS algorithm performs poorly.
We then evaluate the performance of the algorithm in larger networks with 30 users, up to 8 BSs and 512 channels. Fig.  4 shows the comparison of the averaged performance of the proposed algorithm and the nearest BS algorithm. Due to the prohibitive computation time required, we are unable to obtain the optimal system throughput in this case. We instead compute a (strict) upper bound of the maximum throughput assuming that the users can connect to multiple BSs simultaneously. We refer to this as the multiple-connectivity network. We also observe that when we take the switching costs into consideration (c i = 1 Mbps for all i), there is a slight decrease in system throughput.
In Fig. 5 , we show the distribution of the per-BS rates achieved by the proposed algorithm and the nearest BS algorithm. From the figure we see that the proposed algorithm is able to distribute the throughput to different BSs fairly, while the nearest BSs algorithm may result in severe unbalance of the BSs' loads (some BSs may experience heavy traffic while the rest of the BSs may become idle).
B. An Outdoor Multicell Cellular Network Scenario
In this section we demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm in a multicell OFDMA cellular network. Standard cellular network parameters are used for the simulation, see Table V 2 . Again frequency selective channels with a Rayleigh fading component and 8 dB log-normal fading component are simulated. Users are assumed to be distributed uniformly in the entire network. Throughout this subsection, the system level PF objective is optimized, thus the CA-PF strategy discussed in Section V is used for the per-BS resource allocation. The solution to the problem (CA-PF) is computed using Algorithm 1 in [27] . Note that in order for the proposed algorithm to work in this network setting, inter-cell interference should be treated as noise. That is, user i's noise power on channel k, n k i , should include both the environmental noise power and the inter-cell interference power.
We first show the convergence of the algorithm. In the considered cellular network, different BSs transmit using the same spectrum bands. Thus our theoretical analysis of the convergence is no longer valid. However, convergence is still observed empirically. See Table VI for the comparison of the convergence speed with and without the switching costs {c i }.
We then demonstrate the throughput performance of the algorithm. We compare the proposed algorithm with the nearest BS algorithm and the "Greedy-0" algorithm proposed in [29] , which is a centralized algorithm that finds a good user-BS association by successively perturbing the user-BS association locally. In Table VII and Fig. 7 , we see that the proposed algorithm compares favorably with the other algorithms both in terms of system throughput and fairness levels. Each entry in the table is obtained via an average of 200 randomly generated networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied a resource management problem in a multi-cell network in the presence of strategic/selfish users. We propose a novel mechanism that implements a strategy-proof and approximately optimal scheme in dominant strategies. Utilizing a key submodularity property of the per-BS throughput function, we characterized the efficiency of the proposed mechanism. As a future work, we will study the case in which there is limited (low rate) feedback from the users to the BSs. In this case feedback strategy needs to be designed in conjunction with the BSs' and the users' strategies. A new approximation ratio needs to be derived for this more practical scenario. Another interesting extension of the current work is to include the users that are hostile instead of non-cooperative. Strategies that are different from pricing are needed in this case to counter the untruthfulness induced by the hostility. 
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IX. APPENDIX A. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose a * ∈ arg max a R(a), but a * is not a pure NE. Then there must exist a user i such that BR i (a * ) = ∅. Choose w ∈ BR i (a * ), and define a new association profile a = [ w, a * −i ]. Let w * = a * [i]. We show in (13) that user i's unilateral change of association has the same effect on its own utility as well as on the system throughput. In step (a) of (13), we use the definition of the utility function (7), and the fact that a *
From the assumption, user 
i prefers to switch to BS w, then U i ( a) > U i (a * ). This combined with (13) yields R( a) > R(a * ), which is a contradiction to the optimality of a * . Then we have a * ∈ arg max a R(a) is a NE for game G.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
We show that (12) is true for all k ∈ Q and k ∈ Q.
Step 1) We argue that for all k ∈ Q, (12) , to show the inequality (12) , it suffices to show the following decreasing difference property
From [30] , we know that whenever the function R w (x) is differentiable with respect to x[k], the decreasing difference property of (14) is equivalent to the property in (15) on the next page. In what follows, we prove that for any k with h[k] > m[k] = g[k], the limit in (15) exists and is nonpositive. To this end, a closer look at the function R w (·) is necessary. Let p k g denote the power allocation for channel k when the best channel gain vector is g, and let λ g denote the corresponding dual variable. From the CAPA strategy, we have that p k g = [λ g − 1 g[k] ] + . Define the active channel set as K g {k|λ g − 1 g[k] ≥ 0}. From the fact that the power constraint must be active for the CAPA strategy, we have that
=p w , which implies that
.
Using this expression and the expression for p k g , we have that
We argue that when m ≤ g, we must have λ g ≤ λ m . Otherwise, if λ g > λ m , due to the fact that 1 g[k] ≤ 1 m[k] , we must have p k g > p k m , ∀ k ∈ K m , which implies k∈Km p k g > k∈Km p k m =p w , a violation of the total power constraint. Take any channel k * with h[k * ] > m[k * ] = g[k * ], and define the best channel gains after the increase on channel k * as m * = m + e k * × δ and g * = g + e k * × δ, respectively. Let K m * and K g * denote the set of active channels. Comparing K m and K m * , we have the following four cases: m1) there exists an > 0 such that for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ , K m = K m * ; m2) for all δ > 0, K m ⊃ K m * ; m3) for all δ > 0, K m ⊂ K m * ; m4) for all δ > 0, K m = K m * . Similarly, we have four cases g1)-g4) comparing the sets K g and K g * . In the following we give the expression for lim δ→0
for each of the cases m1)-m4).
We first consider case m1). In the neighborhood of 0 < δ ≤ , R w (m * ) can be expressed as
Consequently, in the neighborhood of 0 < δ ≤ , we have
We then consider case m2). This case is shown by 4 steps.
Step (m2-1): We first show k * ∈ K m . If on the contrary, λ m − 1 m[k * ] < 0, then due to the continuity of p k * m with respect to m, there must exist an > 0 such that for all 0 < δ < , p k * m * < 0, which is equivalent to λ m * − 1 m * [k * ] < 0. This implies K m = K m * for 0 < δ < , which contradicts the assumption that K m ⊃ K m * , ∀ δ > 0.
Step (m2-2) We then argue that k * ∈ K m * . Assume the contrary, then λ m * − 1 m * [k * ] < 0 . From the previous step, we see that λ m − 1 m[k * ] ≥ 0. Then it must be the case that λ m > λ m * . Due to the fact that for all other channels k = k * , m[k] = m * [k], then we must havep w = K k=1 p k m > K k=1 p k m * =p w , a contradiction.
Step (m2-3) We have argued that k * must remain in the active set. Then for small enough, there must exist a single channelk = k * such thatk ∈ K m butk / ∈ K m * , for all
The dual variables λ m and λ m * can be expressed as
,
The difference between the above two dual variables is
where (a) is from the fact that m * ≥ m, and use the same argument in the paragraph following (17 
where in (a), (b) we have used the fact that λ m = 1 m[h] . Using L'Hopital's rule, we obtain
For the cases m3)-m4), the derivation is similar to the cases of m1)-m2). The key observation is still that the channel k * must satisfy k * ∈ K m and k * ∈ K m * , and that the channelk that leaves or joins the set K m * must satisfy λ m = 1 m[k] . For these cases, (22) again holds true.
Fix δ < 0, and redo the above analysis by switching the role of m and m * for all four possible cases, we can obtain .
For case g1)-g4), the exact same argument leads to the same result. In summary, we obtain
Recall that k * ∈ Q, which means that m[k * ] = g[k * ]. Using the fact that g ≥ m, and λ g ≤ λ m , we conclude that (15) is true for all k with h[k] > m[k] = g[k].
Step 2) We then argue that for any channel k ∈ Q, (12) must be true. For any g ≥ m ≥ 0, pick k ∈ Q, we have the following three cases 
where the inequality is due to the monotonicity property. It is sufficient to show 
which reduces to the case in Step 1) (cf. condition (14) ). We also have that (12) is true.
Combining with our argument in Step 1), we conclude that (12) is true for all k ∈ K.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
Let c (t) denote the better-reply association at time t:
. Define two sets C and A: c ∈ C ⇒ c appears infinitely often (i.o.) in {c (t) } ∞ t=1 , and a ∈ A ⇒ a i.o. in {a (t) } ∞ t=1 .
The first claim is that there exists a * ∈ A that is a pure NE for game G. Observe that the sets |A| > 0 and |C| > 0 due to the finiteness of the possible association profiles. Suppose |A| = 1, then the single element in A, say a * , must be a NE. Suppose |A| > 1, and choose c * ∈ C. Pick a time t such that c (t) = c * . Note that c * [i] is in the front of the memory for each user i, then with probability at least ( 1 M ) N , a (t+1) = c * . This implies c * ∈ A. If c * is a NE, then our claim is proved. If c * is not a NE, we will show that with positive probability, we can construct a finite sequence that leads to a NE. To this end, consider the following steps of operation. Step 2): Observe that for all i ∈ U, there must exist a constant k i such that 0 < k i < n ≤ N and that its current association a (T ) [i] is sampled from its k i th memory, i.e., c (T −ki) [i] = a (T ) [i] . Pick q ∈ U that has the largest k i and is willing to switch at time T : q = arg max i∈U ,c (T ) 
